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The	 global	 financial	 crisis	 has	 ushered	 in	 a	 major	 housing	 crisis	 in	 many	 European	 countries:	 severe	
shortage	 of	 affordable	 housing,	 high	 rates	 of	 housing	 deprivation	 especially	 in	 Europe’s	 East,	 over-





the	 housing	 crisis,	 there	 is	 scantly	 a	 clearer	 time	 to	 expect	 social	 housing	 to	 be	 high	 on	 the	 political	
agenda.	However,	 in	many	 cases	 the	housing	policy	 response	 to	 the	 crisis	 in	 Europe	 tended	 to	 reflect	
pre-crisis	policy	ideas	and	recipes,	rather	than	shifts	towards	an	increased	emphasis	on	social	housing.		
This	paper	 investigates	 the	neglect	of	 social	housing	 in	post-crisis	Hungary	and	 Ireland,	 two	peripheral	
European	countries	particularly	hard	hit	by	the	housing	crisis.	We	investigate	how	governments	in	both	
countries	 frame	 the	housing	question,	 and	how	 they	 strategically	 use	 the	 issue	of	 housing	 to	 build	 or	
sustain	 social	 coalitions	 around	 housing	 that	 systematically	 exclude	 the	 most	 precarious	 households.	
Following	Jabko’s	(2016)	strategic	constructivism,	we	argue	that	housing	policy	represents	a	marketplace	
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policies	 that	 continue	 to	 primarily	 cater	 to	 the	 existing	 housing	 coalitions.	 To	 put	 it	 differently:	while	
there	were	significant	housing	policy	responses	to	the	crisis	in	Hungary	and	Ireland,	these	did	not	target	
the	most	vulnerable	segments	of	the	population	and	focused	on	mortgage	relief	or	support	for	existing	
homeowners.	While	policies	actively	 supported	 the	previous	beneficiaries	of	housing	policy	before	 the	
crisis,	they	largely	excluded	the	most	vulnerable	households.		
The	paper	is	structured	as	follows.	In	the	next	section,	we	summarize	the	housing	needs	and	structures	
























Figure	3	 summarizes	 the	government	 spending	on	housing	policy	as	a	 share	of	GDP.	The	 figure	 shows	
that	government	spending	on	housing	 increased	significantly	 in	 Ireland	during	the	crisis.	However,	 this	
increase	 did	 not	 break	 the	 secular	 trend	of	 declining	 spending.	 In	Hungary,	 the	 expenditure	 has	 been	
relatively	 steady,	 but	 there	 is	 a	 marked	 decrease	 in	 2009	 as	 a	 part	 of	 austerity	 packages	 and	 an	
increasing	trend	since	the	second	Orbán	government	took	office	in	2010.	This	demonstrates	that	housing	




















is	a	clear	 trend	of	 low	 income	households	shifting	 from	homeownership	 into	 rental	markets,	 including	
social	and	private	markets.	We	will	explore	this	shift	in	the	case	study	later	in	the	paper.		
3.	Strategic	constructions	of	frames	in	a	multifaceted	policy	area	
To	 understand	 when	 and	 whether	 social	 housing	 was	 a	 politically	 salient	 issue,	 we	 investigate	 the	
coalitions	 of	 actors	 around	 the	 existing	 housing	 paradigms	 (Hall	 1993).	 We	 argue	 that	 the	 dominant	
frame	for	housing	helps	governments	to	forge	coalitions	of	actors	that	“strategically	construct”	housing	
policy	(Jabko	2006).	Given	the	multiplicity	of	frames	for	housing	policy	presented	below,	we	argue	that	a	










the	 state.	 This	 paradigm	 still	 recognizes	 the	 primary	 role	 of	markets	 for	 distributing	 housing,	 but	 it	 is	
based	 on	 egalitarian	 values	 and	 necessitates	 state	 intervention	 to	 secure	 housing	 for	 those	 who	 are	
unable	 to	 obtain	 it	 on	 the	 market.	 This	 paradigm	 essentially	 shaped	 Scandinavian	 post-war	 policies	
(Christophers	 2013).	 On	 the	 opposite	 extreme	 is	 housing	 as	 an	 asset,	 which	 emphasized	 individual	
property	 rights	and	 the	efficiency	of	markets	 for	distribution.	State	 intervention	would	be	generally	 to	






in	 vulnerable	 housing	 situations.	 Property	 is	 inherited	 from	 family	 or	 family	 support	 enables	 the	
acquisition	of	new	housing.	Like	housing	as	an	asset,	high	homeownership	is	likely	due	to	the	priority	to	
keep	property	in	the	family.	Families	are	valued	as	a	stabilizing	force	in	a	rapidly	changing	world	and	this	











(Jabko	 2006,	 26).	 We	 detect	 coalitions	 between	 actors	 that	 promote	 specific	 approaches	 to	 housing	
policy	 and	 often	 these	 actors	 have	 different	 end	 goals,	 but	 agreement	 on	 an	 intermediate	 goal.	 For	
example,	increasing	access	to	homeownership	for	families	may	fit	with	the	long-term	goals	of	housing	as	
an	asset	or	housing	as	patrimony.	Jabko	argues	that	the	market	was	“invoked	to	legitimize	a	surprisingly	
wide	 range	of	policies”	 in	 the	 integration	of	 the	European	Union	 (Jabko	2006,	 30).	 Similarly,	we	 claim	
that	 promotion	 of	 social	 housing	 can	 imply	 a	 diverse	 range	 of	 policies,	 depending	 on	 the	 coalition	 of	
actors	behind	it	and	the	dominant	frame	for	housing.		
We	would	expect	 strengthening	of	 social	housing	policy	 that	 includes	primarily	public	housing	options	
only	when	the	groups	with	 the	most	precarious	housing	situation,	usually	 low	 income	households,	are	
included	 in	 the	 strategic	 coalitions	 that	 frame	housing	policy.	 In	our	empirical	 case	 studies,	 this	 rarely	












the	 development	 in	 social	 housing	 policy	 after	 the	 crisis,	 but	 also	 outline	 the	 existing	 programs	 to	
provide	contexts.	One	important	difference	between	the	two	cases	is	degree	of	centralization	of	housing	






1980s.	 After	 the	 breakdown	 of	 communism,	 Hungarian	 housing	 policy	 gradually	 shifted	 towards	 the	
paradigm	 of	 housing	 as	 an	 asset	 (Bohle	 and	 Seabrooke	 2017).	 	 Since	 the	 crisis,	 the	 primary	 housing	
programs	have	been	mortgage	support	programs	(reflecting	housing	as	an	asset),	especially	those	that	
focused	 on	 housing	 for	 families	 (reflecting	 housing	 as	 patrimony).	 Although	 these	 programs	 were	
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to	 buying	 their	 own	 home.	 The	 program	 that	most	 clearly	 resembles	 a	 social	 housing	 program	was	 a	
system	of	 rental	apartments	owned	by	 local	governments	and	 leased	 to	households	 in	need.	The	 rent	
was	 below	 market	 rates,	 but	 the	 precise	 level	 was	 decided	 by	 the	 municipality	 as	 there	 were	 no	
centralized	rent	controls.	The	local	governments	were	responsible	for	maintaining	the	housing	units	and	
generally	had	insufficient	funding	to	cover	the	costs	(Vigvári	2008).	This	produced	a	double	incentive	for	















The	 large	 sale	 selling	 off	 of	 the	municipal	 housing	 stock	 supported	 the	dominance	of	 homeownership	
and	 left	 very	 limited	 options	 for	 the	 households	without	 secure	 funding.	 This	 process	 generated	 new	
homeowners,	but	limited	the	opportunity	for	future	social	housing	programs,	as	the	privatization	reform	





The	 goals	 of	 the	 mortgage	 support	 systems	 were	 multifaceted,	 ranging	 from	 pronatalist	 policy	 to	
development	of	financial	markets	and	promotion	of	the	construction	industry.	The	program	introduced	
by	the	Fidesz	government	after	the	crisis	(CSOK)	reflected	the	logic	of	the	first	mortgage	support	system	
introduced	 in	 2000	 (szocpol),	 which	 is	 why	 we	 discuss	 these	 programs	 together	 in	 this	 section.	 The	
programs	 were	 clearly	 not	 designed	 to	 target	 the	 households	 with	 the	 most	 vulnerable	 housing	
situations,	 which	 corresponds	 to	 the	 middle	 class	 oriented	 welfare	 approach	 of	 the	 Hungarian	
conservative	 party	 that	 introduced	 most	 of	 these	 programs	 (Buskó	 2016).	 The	 beneficiaries	 of	 these	
programs	 included	 (mostly	middle	 and	 upper	 class)	 families,	 banks,	 and	 construction	 companies.	 The	
political	framing	of	these	programs	suggest	that	they	are	the	closest	match	to	a	social	housing	program	
in	 Hungary.	 In	 fact,	 precisely	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 beneficiaries	 of	 this	 mortgage	 support	 approach	 to	













support	 systems	by	both	 the	 right	and	 left	 governments	emphasized	 support	 for	 (upper)	middle	 class,	
young	families	to	build	or	buy	new	homes.	The	program	introduced	by	the	left	government	from	2002-
09	 (“Nesting”	 program,	 “Fészekrakó	 program”)	 also	 included	 some	 rental	 support	 for	 low	 income	
families,	 but	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 program	was	 limited	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 rental	market	 in	 Hungary	 is	








the	 housing	 policy	 of	 the	 first	 Orbán	 government	 (Hegedüs	 2017).	 Pronatalist	 logic	 was	 even	 more	
evident	 as	 the	 CSOK	 program	 introduced	 in	 2015	 targeted	 families	 with	 at	 least	 three	 children.	 In	
additional	 to	 mortgage	 support	 systems,	 the	 government	 waived	 VAT	 tax	 on	 building	 materials	 for	
families	that	qualified.	These	programs	encouraged	the	purchase	or	building	of	new	housing	units,	which	
were	clearly	aligned	with	the	interests	of	the	construction	sector.	After	much	political	debate	and	public	




denominated	 loans	 who	 suddenly	 faced	 escalated	 levels	 of	 debt.	 Foreign	 denominated	 mortgages	
represented	70%	of	the	mortgage	portfolio	(Housing	Europe	2015).	The	policies	included	a	moratorium	
on	 foreclosures,	 a	 National	 Asset	 Management	 Company	 to	 buy	 up	 properties	 that	 faced	 default,	
schemes	for	early	repayment	or	setting	a	maximum	loan	rate,	forcing	banks	to	accept	conversion	of	debt	
to	Hungarian	 forint,	 and	more	 (for	 a	 comprehensive	 summary,	 see	Csizmady	 and	Hegedus	 2016).	 The	
beneficiaries	of	these	programs	were	suddenly	very	vulnerable	based	on	the	exponential	growth	of	debt	
levels	due	to	exchange	rate	changes.	However,	these	were	not	necessarily	low	income	households.	One	
main	 strategy	was	 to	 enable	households	 to	pay	off	 the	debt	 in	 full	 on	 relatively	 favorable	 terms.	 This	
option	was	clearly	more	feasible	for	higher	income	households	and	about	20-25	percent	of	households	
holding	 foreign-denominated	 debt	 utilized	 this	 option	 (Hegedüs	 2017,	 95).	 The	 lowest	 income	
households	 that	 also	 held	 foreign-denominated	 debt	 generally	 had	 years	 of	 accumulated	 arrears	 and	
insufficient	resources	to	pay	off	the	loan,	even	with	a	favorable	exchange	rate.	The	Orbán	government’s	
main	 approach	 was	 that	 (foreign-owned)	 banks	 should	 bear	 the	 burden	 of	 responsibility	 and	 (upper)	
middle	class	household	should	be	relieved	of	the	debt	burden.	
The	 range	 of	 policy	 options	 also	 included	 programs	 for	 lower	 income	 households.	 The	National	 Asset	
Management	Company	(NAMC)	bought	delinquent	 loans	and	the	rented	the	apartments	to	the	former	
owner	 at	 below	market	 rates	with	 the	 option	 to	 buy	 back	 the	 home	 in	 five	 years.	 The	 program	 gave	
priority	to	families	with	children.	One	issue	was	that	30	percent	of	the	participating	households	could	not	
afford	 the	 reduced	 rate	of	 rent	 due	 to	being	 completely	 overwhelmed	with	debt	 (Hegedüs	 2017,	 96).	
Another	policy	response	that	most	closely	resembled	a	social	housing	response	was	the	construction	of	a	
public	 housing	 community	 in	Ocsa,	 south	 of	 Budapest.	 This	 housing	was	 intended	 to	 help	 households	
who	lost	their	homes	due	to	foreclosures.	However,	very	few	people	moved	into	these	housing	units,	as	
the	 transportation	 from	 this	 site	 to	 Budapest	 is	 difficult.	 The	 cost	 efficiency	 of	 the	 program	 was	
disastrous	(helping	about	40	households	burdened	by	foreign-denominated	debt)	and	the	space	rather	
became	an	emergency	shelter	for	people	whose	homes	were	destroyed	in	natural	disasters.	The	choice	
to	 build	 a	 new	public	 housing	 facility	 rather	 than	 rental	 support	 for	 households	 to	move	 into	 existing	
apartments	again	indicates	a	preference	to	support	the	construction	industry.	
Framing	the	policy	choice	




has	 the	 interests	of	 the	 construction	 industry	and	upper	middle	 class	 families	at	 its	 core.	When	asked	
about	 social	 rental	 housing	 during	 a	 parliamentary	 debate,	 the	 Minister	 for	 the	 National	 Economy,	
András	 Tállai	 said,	 “The	 government	 prefers	 house	 creation	 programs	 [over	 building	 social	 housing	
units],	and	that	is	why	we	created	CSOK,	because	for	some	reason	Hungarian	people	like	to	live	in	their	
own	 homes,	 rather	 than	 in	 other	 people’s”2.	 This	 confirms	 that	 any	 housing	 policy	 of	 the	 current	
government	 will	 aim	 to	 support	 homeowners	 who	 are	 indeed	 in	 the	 majority,	 but	 this	 leaves	 little	
options	 for	 vulnerable	 households	 without	 access	 to	 homeownership.	 When	 Prime	 minister	 Orbán	
described	 the	 motivation	 behind	 the	 CSOK	 program,	 he	 said,	 “Regarding	 housing	 development,	 this	
policy	 is	 simultaneously	 a	 family	 benefit	 and	 an	 economic	 growth	 stimulus”3	 (“Orbán	Viktor	Napirend	
Előtti	 Felszólalása”	 2016).	 These	 statements	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 exclusion	 of	 the	 most	 vulnerable	
population	 is	 an	 explicit	 political	 choice,	which	 helps	 explain	 the	 lack	 of	 social	 housing	 programs	 that	
benefit	low	income	households.	.	
Furthermore	 the	 policy	 choice	 to	 support	 new	 buildings	 indicates	 strong	 support	 for	 the	 construction	




ones.	 The	 coalition	 with	 the	 construction	 industry	 and	 domestic	 banks	 was	 explicitly	 stated	 by	
government	 representatives	 (See	 for	 example:	 “Parliamentary	 Debate	 on	 Housing	 Creation	 Program”	
2016).	 The	 government	 could	 legitimize	 their	 approach	 housing	 and	 the	 absences	 of	 the	 model	 of	
housing	as	a	social	 right	was	unproblematic,	as	 their	approach	explicitly	combined	housing	as	an	asset	






















rates	 from	78	percent	 in	2005	 to	70	percent	 in	2015	 (European	Mortgage	Federation	2017,	33)	 and	a	
growth	 in	 both	 private	 and	 social	 rental	 markets.	 While	 these	 shifts	 are	 significant,	 we	 claim	 that	
preferential	treatment	of	homeowners	still	defines	Ireland’s	social	housing	policy.	
Assistance	leading	to	homeownership	
In	 the	 decades	 before	 the	 crisis,	 the	 primary	 concern	was	 affordability	 of	 housing	 due	 to	 rising	 home	
prices.	 The	 social	 housing	 policy	 primarily	 focused	 on	 enabling	 low	 income	 households	 to	 also	 have	
access	to	homeownership.	The	Irish	model	of	“socialized	homeownership	regime”	involved	a	wide	range	
of	 programs	 to	 supported	 transition	 to	 homeownership	 (for	 a	 comprehensive	 summary,	 see	 Norris	
2016).	This	included	making	mortgages	more	accessible	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	and	support	for	people	
in	 government	 sponsored	 housing	 programs	 to	 become	 homeowners	 in	 earlier	 waves	 of	 selling	 off	
government	housing	at	low	prices	in	the	1990s.	For	example,	the	Shared	Ownership	Program,	introduced	
in	 1991	 and	 expanded	 several	 times,	 enabled	 low	 income	 households	 to	 select	 a	 home	 for	 purchase,	
which	was	purchased	by	local	authorities	and	the	beneficiaries	lived	in	the	home	and	made	payments	to	
the	local	authorities	gradually	shifting	the	equity	to	the	beneficiary	over	the	course	of	25	years	until	they	
reached	 full	 homeownership	 (Norris	 and	 Winston	 2003,	 57).	 There	 was	 also	 a	 Mortgage	 Allowance	
Scheme,	which	 gave	 financial	 incentives	 for	 households	 in	 social	 housing	 units	 to	 buy	 housing	 on	 the	
private	 market.	 This	 implied	 that	 many	 of	 the	 beneficiaries	 of	 social	 housing	 programs	 became	
homeowners,	as	was	the	case	in	Hungary	through	the	privatization	of	social	housing.	This	meant	that	at	
the	onset	of	 the	housing	crisis	 in	both	countries,	 the	 interests	of	households	 facing	housing	 insecurity	











The	 programs	 supporting	 socialized	 homeownership	 were	 abolished	 in	 2011	 as	 a	 part	 of	 broader	
austerity	measures.	For	a	 few	years	housing	policy	 focused	on	managing	widespread	 foreclosures.	The	
levels	 and	 risks	 of	 homelessness	 increased	 sharply,	 which	 represented	 a	 return	 to	 dependence	 on	
families	 (Bohle	and	Seabrooke	2017,	19).	 There	was	also	a	notable	policy	 shift	 to	put	 an	emphasis	on	
social	 rental	housing	(see	Figure	4	above).	Support	 for	social	rental	housing	may	be	framed	as	a	major	
policy	shift	 in	 Irish	social	housing,	but	a	closer	examination	reveals	that	even	these	policies	are	market	
oriented	 and	 benefit	 homeowners	 and	 property	 developers.	 This	 is	 because	 rather	 than	 public	 social	
housing,	the	program	predominantly	provided	rental	support	for	housing	rented	on	the	private	market	
(Finnerty,	 O’Connell,	 and	 O’Sullivan	 2016;	 “Rebuilding	 Ireland:	 Action	 Plan	 for	 Housing	 and	











Figure	6	below	shows	the	development	of	 social	housing	provision	 in	 Ireland.	 It	 shows	that	during	 the	
crisis,	 overall	 social	 housing	 provision	 has	 decreased,	 and	 local	 authorities	 have	 almost	 completely	
withdrawn	from	public	housing	provision.	It	is	only	in	2015	that	–	mostly	as	a	result	-	of	the	new	Housing	










expand	social	housing	clearly	 reflect	 the	 long-standing	coalition	between	banks,	existing	homeowners,	
and	developers.	Significant	incentives	were	offered	to	encourage	investment	in	property,	which	benefits	
landlords,	 banks	 (through	 increased	 lending),	 and	 the	 construction	 industry.	 There	 are	 clearly	 more	






In	 2017,	 almost	 a	 decade	 after	 Ireland’s	 housing	 boom	 turned	 bust,	 the	 Irish	 Minister	 for	 Housing	
describes	 the	country	 in	a	grip	of	a	housing	crisis.4	 In	Hungary,	meanwhile	 there	 is	a	deafening	silence	
about	the	fact	that	the	country	has	the	second	highest	rate	of	severe	housing	deprivation	in	the	EU	after	
Romania.5	 These	grave	 facts	notwithstanding,	 housing	policies	 are	 still	 largely	 shaped	by	 governments	
that	 rely	 on	 pre-crisis	 coalitions	 of	 homeowners,	 the	 construction	 industry,	 developers,	 and	 banks.	
Housing	policies	are	framed	in	terms	of	families,	or	asset	preservation.	There	 is	a	 surprising	stability	of	








not	officially	 recorded.	This	means	 that	policies	 to	encourage	 landlords	or	 to	expand	 the	 rental	 sector	
failed,	as	they	never	offered	a	more	appealing	arrangement	than	remaining	in	the	unofficial	economy.	In	













































































Europe’s Demographic Challenge  
 
Eleni Tsingou (Copenhagen Business School) 
 
This chapter provides an overview of how demographic change is being discussed and addressed 
at the European Union level. It identifies some of the key actors operating in the Brussels arena 
and finds four key areas of policy activity: skill gaps and human capital; pension reform; work-
life balance and policies enabling choice on family formation; and active/healthy ageing.  The 
chapter explains that the bulk of this policy activity takes place in an institutional vacuum as 
authority on these issues is highly diffuse, policy timelines fragmented, and funding support 
scarce or politicized. As such demographic challenges are slow-burning in their temporal 
dimension, poorly communicated as talk between policymakers, experts, and the public, and have 
not led to specific tools. The chapter studies actor interactions and the spaces of policy 
discussions, including spaces as varied as the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
and demography professional associations. It also explores the extent to which cooperation with 
non-governmental organisations and business actors provides opportunities for policy advocacy. 
It concludes that the most fruitful interventions at the European Union level happen around 
discussions about employment but that links to demographic change per se depend on policy 






Governing Social Divergence in the Eurozone  
Laszlo Andor (Université libre de Bruxelles) 
 
The divergence that has developed within the euro area between core and periphery is the main 
threat to the existence of the single currency and to the stability of the EU as a whole. There is a 
dire need to develop governance tools that can strengthen the EMU architecture, and in particular 
to strengthen its real economic performance and its social dimension. Better governance is 
necessary, but it is not obvious that member states would hand over competences to a stronger 
EMU level governance structure without more risk sharing. This would also help strengthen 
public acceptance of the EMU. This chapter discusses how these issues must be addressed to 
avoid a slow-burning crises of greater social divergence and economic stagnation. While the ideal 
timing for paradigmatic shifts in policy thinking may have passed, policy frames must be 
developed at the European level that can deal with these issues, such as automatic stabilizers and 
unemployment insurance. A key question, however, is whether there is still sufficient political 
capital left among mainstream political forces to promote solutions that can counter the internal 
imbalances and divergence between the core and periphery within the Eurozone. These actors 
must engage in talk that focuses on strengthening discipline, solidarity and legitimacy 
simultaneously. A game changer for investment, growth and rebalancing is needed, and most 
likely it will be found in the area of fiscal capacity. 
	
